

令和 8 年度（2026 年度）

大学院 経済研究科（博士課程Ⅱ期）入学試験

## I. 英語

下の問題について、日本語で全文を訳しなさい。

(1)

Henry Mintzberg suggests that organizations can be differentiated along three basic dimensions. The first is the key part of the organization, which plays the major role in determining its success or failure. The second is the prime coordinating mechanism, representing the major method the organization uses to coordinate its activities. The third is the type of decentralization used, which refers to the extent to which the organization involves subordinates in the decision-making process.

Using these three dimensions, Mintzberg suggests that an organization's strategy results in five structural configurations. The simple structure is characterized by a strategic apex and direct supervision, typically found in small organizations where coordination is informal. The machine bureaucracy relies on the technostructure and the standardization of work processes, aiming for internal efficiency in stable environments. In contrast, the professional bureaucracy focuses on the operating core and the standardization of skills, allowing highly trained professionals to provide non-routine services with significant autonomy.

The divisionalized form utilizes the middle line and the standardization of output, where decision-making is decentralized at the divisional level. Finally, the adhocracy emphasizes the support staff and mutual adjustment, focusing on innovation and rapid adaptation to changing environments. While few organizations are pure examples of these forms, this framework provides a vital understanding of the relationship between an organization's strategy and its structure.

(Adapted from Fred C. Lunenburg, "Organizational Structure: Mintzberg's Framework," *International Journal of Scholarly, Academic, Intellectual Diversity*, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2012)

(2)

Microeconomic efficiency, or Pareto optimality, is achieved when it is impossible to make one person better off without making someone else worse off. In theory, government policy seeks to improve microeconomic efficiency by correcting a market failure, defined as the failure of a system of price-market institutions to stop “undesirable” activities. Accordingly, a market failure can be defined as an equilibrium allocation of resources that is not Pareto optimal—the potential causes of which may be market power, natural monopoly, imperfect information, externalities, or public goods.

On what basis is one to conclude that a policy to correct a market failure is as successful as possible? The first consideration is whether government has any reason to intervene in a market: Is there evidence of a serious market failure to correct? The second is whether government policy is at least improving market performance: Is it reducing the economic inefficiency, or “deadweight” loss, from market failure? Hence, the final consideration is whether government policy is optimal: Is it efficiently correcting the market failure and maximizing economic welfare?

Government failure, then, arises when government has created inefficiencies because it should not have intervened in the first place or when it could have solved a given problem or set of problems more efficiently, that is, by generating greater net benefits. In other words, the theoretical benchmark of Pareto optimality could be used to assess government performance just as it is used to assess market performance.

(Adapted from Clifford Winston, *Government Failure versus Market Failure*, AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, 2006)